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ABSTRACT
DOES FREE TUITION HELP OR HINDER THE POOR?
By
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Committee Chair: Dr. Daniel Kreisman
Major Department: Economics
This dissertation consists of two chapters that study a free tuition policy in Chile. This is
a politically charged issue on which there is still little evidence, which makes it a difficult but
especially important policy to study. In 2016, Chile waived tuition for the poorest 50% of the
population. In the first year of implementation, this policy covered mostly academic programs.
In the second year, it was extended to technical education. This stepwise implementation offers
an interesting perspective for studying the self-selection of vulnerable students in technical or
professional careers.
In the first chapter, I exploit the arbitrary cut that this policy uses to estimate the effect of free
tuition on the type of program low-income student choose. Using a Regression Discontinuity Design and a Difference-in-Difference approach, I show that the policy increased college enrollment
for eligible students by around seven percentage points in total. This increase was driven mainly
by high ability, low-income students, who enrolled in larger numbers and did so in higher quality
institutions. Results suggest that despite a generous loan program in Chile, the removal of tuition
for low-income students led to meaningful changes in college accessibility.
In the second chapter, I present the potential effect of this policy on the mismatching of vulnerable students. Through a detailed descriptive analysis, I show that access to higher education
in Chile, especially to selective programs, is closely related to student income. The differential in
student performance cannot fully explain this gap, suggesting that there are spaces to democratize
access to higher education further.

As a whole, this thesis shows that low-income, high-performance students face economic constraints that prevent them from entering selective and high-return programs. This problem exists
even in the absence of restrictions on access to credit, as shown in this case.
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Introduction
Unequal access to higher education is a problem that worries experts, politicians, and citizens alike.
Accentuated by the increasing cost of college and the rise in student debt that this has entailed, this
inequality reflects access to higher education and the type of programs to which people of different
socioeconomic backgrounds choose. Low-income students tend not to enroll in college. Among
those who enroll, the majority do so in technical programs, which tend to be shorter, less expensive,
and with lower economic returns. How much of these decisions are due to economic constraints?
It is an empirical question that still needs to be answered, which has significant public policy
implications.
In this context, governments have different options to improve access to higher education for
low-income students. Among these, free tuition is trending to the front of the political debate as
countries, such as Chile, are moving in that direction, while others, such as England, have moved
away from it. A significant group of politicians and economists argue that the free tuition would
benefit more students of wealthier backgrounds, who would end up displacing more vulnerable
students towards less selective, low-return programs. As they are better prepared for college selection tests, wealthier students have an academic advantage over low-income students, giving them a
greater chance of benefiting from free tuition. This, added to how expensive this policy is, imposes
excessive fiscal pressure for a policy that would end up being regressive.
On the other hand, high levels of debt and the economic uncertainty that many families face
impose an excessive burden that diverts students from opting for careers with higher economic
returns, which are usually more expensive and difficult. This causes a mismatch between students
and the quality of the programs they access, where many high-achieving students end up enrolling
in less selective programs. Those who defend free tuition do so from a normative perspective,
understanding the right to education as a fundamental right where each student should access
college according to their abilities and not their socioeconomic status. Despite the importance and
controversy of free tuition, there are still no evaluations regarding its effect on access to higher
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education for low-income students.
In this dissertation, I study the first years of a free tuition policy in Chile that affected the poorest 50% of the population. This policy was implemented in two stages, only covering academic
programs in the first year and then expanding it to technical programs in the second, which gives a
unique perspective to the study. Focusing on differences by income level and high school performance, I present a detailed description of who benefits from free tuition and the type of programs
students choose. At the same time, I study the causal effect of eliminating tuition on low-income
students’ decisions to attend academic or technical programs and their access to high-quality programs.
From an economic theory perspective, eliminating the cost of higher education can have different effects, both in the decision to enroll and in the type of programs that students choose. On the
one hand, by reducing the cost of higher education, the expected return required to invest in education is now lower. Students with lower expected returns would be induced to enroll in college.
On the other hand, since free tuition eliminates some of the risks of enrolling in college, we can
expect high-achieving, low-income students to enroll in more expensive, higher-return programs.
If students are risk-averse, low-income students will be less likely to pursue riskier programs than
their wealthier peers, even when they have the same expected return. This is known in economics
as Decreasing Absolute Risk Aversion. As the risk decreases, this difference between high- and
low-income students should dissipate.
Finally, free tuition can also harm the most impoverished students. As more affluent students
choose to enter free programs, poorer students may be displaced to less selective programs or
simply out of college.
In the first chapter, I exploit the arbitrary cut that this policy uses to estimate the effect of free
tuition on the type of program chosen by low-income students. Using a Regression Discontinuity
Design and a Difference-in-Difference approach, I show that the policy increased college enrollment for eligible students by around seven percentage points in total. This increase was driven
mainly by high ability, low-income students enrolled in larger numbers and enrolled in higher
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quality institutions. Results suggest that despite a generous loan program in Chile, the removal of
tuition for low-income students led to meaningful changes in college accessibility.
In the second chapter, I present the potential effect of this policy on the mismatching of vulnerable students. Through a detailed descriptive analysis, I show that access to higher education in
Chile and more selective programs is closely related to student income. The differential in student
performance cannot fully explain this gap, suggesting that there are spaces to democratize access
to higher education further.
As a whole, this thesis shows that low-income, high-performance students face economic constraints that prevent them from entering selective and high-return programs. This problem exists
even in the absence of restrictions on access to credit, as shown in this case.

3

Chapter 1
The Causal Effect of Free Tuition on Low-income Students’ Access to Higher Education
1.1

Introduction

Unequal access to college is a notable concern in research and policy. In the United States, for
example, college affordability is a key policy concern among researchers, families, and politicians
alike1 . In Chile, rising student debt triggered massive protests demanding free tuition in 2012. In
South Africa, students blocked access to different college campuses to protest tuition increases in
2015. As the cost of college and student debt continues to grow, governments and policymakers
often face multiple options to improve access for low-income students. Among these, free tuition is
trending to the front of the political discourse. The Democratic presidential nominee in the United
States, Joe Biden, signaled that his administration would waive tuition at two-year colleges. And,
while some countries, such as England, have moved away from free tuition, others, such as Chile,
recently adopted this approach. Despite the significance of these decisions, there is still little
evidence on how a free-tuition policy affects low-income students’ decisions to attend college and
the type of college they choose.
In this paper, I estimate the impact of a massive change to college pricing in Chile, resulting
from a policy that waived tuition for the poorest half of the population. The policy was implemented in two steps, with four-year tuition prices going to zero in the first year and technical
college tuition going to zero in the second, adding a unique perspective to the study. Focusing on
differences in income and skill levels, I study how eliminating tuition affects students’ enrollment
in technical or academic programs and how the policy affected access to top-ranked programs
for low-income students. Results can shed light on the degree to which students are financially
constrained in attending (high quality) college, despite the universal availability of loans.
There are many ways how removing tuition may affect students’ decisions, not only in whether
to enroll in college but also in the type of program they choose. First, as the cost of education is
1

https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/02/21/democrats-overwhelmingly-favor-free-college-tuition-whilerepublicans-are-divided-by-age-education/
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now lower, students with lower expected returns may be induced to enroll in college. Those who
would have gone to a technical program may now choose academic programs, which are generally
more expensive and difficult. Second, as free-tuition policies eliminate some risk in the investment
decision, for example, taking loans, low-income, high-achieving students may be induced to enroll
in a higher return, more expensive program. On the other hand, as higher-income students, who are
generally better prepared for college admission tests, decide to enroll in free institutions, they may
push low-income students out of college or into lower-quality programs. The potential effects of
free tuition at these different margins represent relevant policy questions regarding distributional
effects that should be considered when evaluating inequalities in access to higher education.
The literature on financial aid has found mixed effects on college enrollment for low-income
students. While need-based and place-based policies tend to benefit lower-income students (Linsenmeier, Rosen, and Rouse (2006); Alon (2011))2 . The vast and growing literature on financial
aid in the United States (see Page and Scott-Clayton (2016) for a review) contrasts with the scarce
evidence in developing countries. Despite the implementation of free-tuition policies in several
developing countries, there is little to no evidence of these policies’ impact on enrollment. In
part, this lack of evidence comes from data restrictions and difficulties in identifying causal effects. The bulk of the literature is observational (Torres-Cortes, 2019; Arzola, 2019; Espinoza,
Gonzalez-Fiegehen, and Granda, 2019), or ex-ante analyses (Espinoza and Urzúa, 2015; Bucarey,
2018). Only a few studies use quasi-experimental methods (Molina and Rivadeneyra, 2019). Consequently, important questions about the efficiency and efficacy of these policies in improving
access to college for low-income students remain unanswered.
In this paper, I had access to restricted access information in Chile that allows me to perform a
fuzzy regression discontinuity (RD) design to study a free-tuition policy that benefited the poorest
50% of the population in Chile. This arbitrary cutoff introduced massive differences in the price
faced by students just below and those just above the eligibility criteria. Exploiting this disconti2

Some papers find that place-based policies benefit more higher-income students Abraham and Clark (2006)
K2007, others find no effect on college enrollment Kane (1997), others, such as merit-based aid, tend to favor more
students from wealthier backgrounds (Binder and Ganderton, 2002)
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nuity, I can identify the effect of free tuition on median-income students.
The strong internal validity of the RD design comes with an equal-sized drawback: we can
only estimate the effect for students in the 50% of the income distribution. We might expect that
students in the lower tail of the distribution have different effects than their more affluent peers Andrews, DesJardins, and Ranchhod (2010). To address the distributional effects, I complement the
RD strategy with a difference-in-difference approach, comparing eligible to non-eligible students
before and after the implementation. This approach allows me to compare students at different
points of the income distribution and with different skill levels. Here, the main concern comes
from self-selection into applying for financial aid. As the policy created incentives for students
to apply, the sample before and after the policy may differ in many observable and unobservable
characteristics. I overcome this issue using two approaches. The preferred approach explicitly
models the probability of financial aid application and implements an Expectation-Maximization
(EM) algorithm to jointly estimate financial aid and college choice, controlling for unobserved
factors.
The second approach exploits the variation in the proportion of poor students in a school. I
compare students in poorer schools, who are more exposed to the policy, to those in the wealthiest
schools before and after its implementation. This approach bypasses the self-selection problem by
using all students in a graduating cohort, rather than just those with eligibility information, without
adding behavioral assumptions. These two approaches identify related but different effects. While
the first estimates the effect of free tuition on eligible students, the second does it for students in
poor schools.
Results consistently show an increase in enrollment in academic programs. The difference in
difference approach shows that eligible students were 7.3 percentage points (10.6%) more likely to
attend any college and 6.8 points (18.1%) more likely to enroll in an academic program. The effect
was larger for lower-income students, who experienced a 7.8 percentage point (20.2%) increase in
academic programs. This was primarily driven by students who would not have attended college
otherwise. On the other hand, high-achieving students were more likely to forgo technical college
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in favor of academic programs. They were also 6.4 percentage points (16.1% percent) more likely
to enroll in a top-ranked program.
This paper contributes to the literature in three different ways. First, I exploit one of the few
large-scale, need-based financial aid programs that are simple and salient enough to provide clear
evidence of causal effects on college choices. As opposed to Pell Grant (Kane, 1997) and the
Tax Deduction programs (Hoxby and Bulman, 2016) in the United States, the Chilean policy only
required a simple online application and was the most notable policy during its implementation.
Second, results show that failing to control for self-selection may elicit considerable bias in a
difference-in-difference estimation, especially in the technical-academic program margin. This is
important for any study using information from the FAFSA or any other financial aid application
form. Finally, this is the first paper to estimate the causal effect of this free-tuition policy on college
enrollment in Chile, providing valuable information for policymakers and researchers alike. This
paper also extends the research on free-tuition policies to developing countries, where access to
higher education is highly unequal and where the impact of these policies is still uncertain.

1.2

Background

1.2.1

Financial aid policies

There is rich literature studying the effect of financial aid on students’ decisions at the collegegoing and the type-of-program margins in the United States. Using quasi-experimental methods,
most of this research finds a positive and significant effect on college enrollment. In the high end,
estimates suggest an increase in college enrollment of around 6 to 11 percentage points (Dynarski,
2000). A few authors find no effect on the college-going margin (Kane, 1997; DesJardins and
McCall, 2014; Hoxby and Bulman, 2016). In contrast, some find an increase only for in-state
4-year colleges (Cohodes and Goodman, 2014), suggesting students would have still enrolled in
college, but at a different institution.
Studying a merit-based policy, Dynarski (2000) argues that HOPE scholarship in Georgia3 in3

Hope scholarship was implemented in Georgia for the first time in 1993. It offered Georgia residents who gradu-
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creased enrollment by seven percentage points, but most of this effect came from middle-high
income students, and many diverted from technical colleges to in-state, four-year institutions. In a
similar merit-based policy, Page et al. (2018) find that the Pittsburgh promise increased enrollment
in in-state four-year public institutions by 10 percentage points, with a slight advantage for wealthier students. Other merit-based programs present similar trends, such as the Massachusetts Adam
Scholarship (Cohodes and Goodman, 2014), and the New Mexico Success program (Binder and
Ganderton, 2002), where the effect is dominated by middle-high income students shifting towards
in-state, four-year schools.
Other financial aid programs used the place of residence - or graduation - to allocate benefits.
The most prominent place-based program was implemented in Kalamazoo in 20064 . Bartik, Hershbein, and Lachowska (2015) find that enrollment increased by 10 percentage points in in-state
4-year institutions because of this program. Similarly, Andrews, DesJardins, and Ranchhod (2010)
find that eligible students were 11 percentage points more likely to apply to a flagship university,
with a more significant effect for low-income students. In a similar program, Kane (2007), studying
the District of Columbia Tuition Assistance Grant, finds a significant increase in college applications and enrollment. However, grant recipients concentrated in the middle- and higher-income
neighborhoods.
Finally, need-based programs use family income to allocate benefits. The effect of these programs on college enrollment is still ambiguous. While some, evaluating small-scale programs,
find significant effects (Linsenmeier, Rosen, and Rouse, 2006), most of the research studying
large-scale programs find no or minor effects Hoxby and Bulman (2016). This last result is usually
explained by the complexity of the application process (Dynarski, Scott-Clayton, and Wiederspan,
2013), the salience of the program (Hoxby and Bulman, 2016), and the lack of information about
the benefits and eligibility criteria (Dynarski and E., 2006). The policy studied in this paper provides a unique opportunity to evaluate a large-scale, need-based policy that was simple and salient
ated with a GPA of 3.0 or higher free tuition in any in-state technical institute, college, or university.
4
The Kalamazoo Promise offered free or subsidized tuition for students who attended and graduated from a Kalamazoo Public School in high school.
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and affected a diverse set of students from different socioeconomic backgrounds and skills.
The fact that merit-based programs tend to have moderate effects on college-going (Waddell
and Singell, 2011) or that the benefits concentrate in middle-to-high-income students (Dynarski,
2000) has led scholars to argue that merit-aid programs channel financial assistance away from
low-income students and towards those students who would have attended college anyway. We can
make a similar argument for free-tuition policies. If higher-income students, who are on average
better prepared for college, decide to enroll in free institutions, low-income students, who tend
to perform worse in college admission tests, would be pushed towards tuition-charging or lessselective institutions.
1.2.2

Higher education in Chile

When deciding to enroll in higher education, students can choose an academic or a technical track.
There are three different types of tertiary education institutions: Technical Formation Centers
(TFC), Professional Institutes (PI), and Universities. TFCs offer 2-3 years-long technical programs that end with a technical certificate or diploma. PIs offer technical and academic programs
that last between 3 and 4 years and may end with an associate degree. Technical programs represent around 58% of Professional Institutes’ total enrollment. Finally, Universities offer mostly
academic programs that last between 4 and 5 years and may lead to a bachelor’s degree. Universities also offer technical programs that typically last between 3 to 4 years, but these represent
only 3% of Universities’ total enrollment. Therefore, technical programs are highly concentrated
in TFCs and PIs. Almost 93% of enrollment in technical programs is in one of these institutions.
Access to higher education has expanded significantly in Chile in the last decades, but there is
still a large enrollment gap between low-income and high-income students. While the latter are
more likely to enroll in college and do so in more selective and expensive programs, the former
tend to concentrate on technical programs or skip college.
Using a high school ranking based on the proportion of poor students in that high school, I
compare enrollment in technical and academic programs across this ranking. Figure 1.1 shows this
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relation for high school cohort 2014. Students from the poorest 5% schools are more likely not to
enroll in college, and about 50% of those who enroll, do so in a technical program. On the other
end, students from the richest 5% schools mostly enroll in academic programs, and only 21% do
not enroll in college. This fact has led to important discussions regarding which type of education
free tuition should target. Targeting technical education would affect mostly low-income students.
However, there is still little understanding of how low-income students make these decisions and
how much they are affected by economic constraints.

High School Weatlh Percentile

Figure 1.1: High School Wealth and Student Enrollment
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Notes: Percentiles are constructed from a ranking of high schools based on the proportion of poor students that attend
there. Poorer schools (i.e., those with a higher proportion of poor students) are in the lower percentiles. The higher
the percentile, the richer the school.

Given the heterogeneous returns to higher education programs of study (Hastings, Neilson,
and Zimmerman, 2013), understanding how students self-select into technical or academic programs and the role that economic constraints play in this decision can add important information
10

on effective policies to guide students into more selective programs. In the United States, Zimmerman (2014) shows that being admitted to college in Florida led to a positive and high return for
the marginal student. Furthermore, these returns were larger for low-income students. In Chile,
Hastings, Neilson, and Zimmerman (2013) find that more selective programs, which are more expensive and have lower graduation rates, present the highest returns, with no critical heterogeneity
by socioeconomic status. These results suggest that increasing the access to high-quality, high-risk
programs for low-income students may have a substantial economic impact in the log-run.
To enroll in college, students take a centralized admission test called PSU – like the SAT in
the United States – that covers language, history, science, and math. The score obtained in this
test is then used to select students into the programs of their preference. The final application
score combines PSU scores, high school GPA, and the student’s ranking in their high school cohort. Since 2012, 36 public and private universities use a centralized admission system where
an algorithm matches students to a university/program based on their preferences and admission
scores. Professional Institutes and Technical Formation Centers and some private universities do
not participate in the centralized process. Although these institutions also use the admission score
to select students, they do it in a decentralized, independent process.
1.2.3

FUAS and income deciles

Students apply for government benefits by filling the Unique Form of Socioeconomic Accreditation (FUAS – Formulario Unico de Acreditación Socioeconómica). The FUAS is an online application where students report household income, parents’ education level, and family size. The
government uses this information to define the eligibility status for different scholarship and loan
programs.
High school students fill the FUAS for the first time in November of their graduation year5 .
In December, they take the college admission test called PSU. In January, students know if they
are eligible for any government benefit by receiving a battery of potential benefits based on their
5
The FUAS may be filled by any student who is applying for college admission or who is already enrolled in
college but want to resubmit their income information or apply for new scholarships
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FUAS information. Once they know their potential benefits and their PSU scores, students apply
for college in mid-January.
There is a second FUAS application process in February-March. Students may resubmit their
information if their family income has changed since November or if they did not submit it in the
first process. Around 15% of students submit the FUAS in this second process.
To avoid any income manipulation, The Department of Education and the Department of Social Development verify self-reported information with administrative records. Before 2016, the
Department of Education used information from the Internal Revenue Service to verify income. In
2016, the Department of Social Development oversaw income verification, using multiple sources
that captured a broader set of income sources. If a piece of information cannot be verified, the
student must submit evidence of their claim to the Department of Education.
To assign each student to an income decile, the Department of Social Development uses the
Socioeconomic Characterization Survey, a nationally representative survey conducted every two
years, to constructs household per capita income deciles. Then, using the FUAS verified income
information, students are assigned a decile if their income falls within that decile’s cutoffs. Suppose a student disagrees with their socioeconomic assessment. In that case, they may appeal the
decision by showing evidence of income, or lack thereof, that differs from the Department of Social
Development information. Only around 5% of students appeal each year.
1.2.4

Free tuition policy

Until 2016, Chilean financial aid was mostly merit-based, requiring minimum scores or high school
GPA for eligibility. With the introduction of the free-tuition policy, Chile moved towards a needbased aid, where students in the poorest 50% of the population could apply for free tuition at any
public and some private Universities. The only requisites for eligibility are filling the FUAS, being
in the poorest 50% of the population, and enroll in one of the eligible institutions. This benefit was
extended to the poorest 60% in 2018, with the plan to get to 80% by 2022. This created discrete
changes in the cost students faced when enrolling in higher education.
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Figure 1.2 shows the cost scheme faced by eligible and non-eligible students before and after
the policy. In the first year of implementation, only Universities were eligible institutions, making
academic programs cheaper than technical programs. In 2017, the biggest TFCs and PIs were
included to the policy. Because these institutions offer most of the technical programs in Chile,
in 2016 it was primarily academic programs offering free tuition. Table C1 shows the list of
institutions that ascribed to the policy in 2016 and 2017. There are 46 TFCs in Chile, of which six
were eligible for free tuition. Similarly, only 6 of the 38 PIs were eligible. Although the number
of institutions ascribed to the policy is low, these represent 59.8% of the total enrollment in TFCs
and 50% in PIs. Regarding Universities, half of them ascribed to the policy, representing 62.6% of
total enrollment in Universities.
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Figure 1.2: Distribution of Tuition by Type of Program in 2015
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Year

Notes: Dashed line is the average tuition for students who were not eligible for free tuition. Solid line shows the
change in tuition level for eligible students. In 2016, academic programs were cheaper than technical programs.

Around 140,000 students studied for free in 2016, and 35% of them were new students. Of
these new students, almost 54% were recent high school graduates, while the rest spent at least one
year out of school before deciding to enroll. In 2017, the number of beneficiaries grew to 260,000
students. Besides the cumulative effect from the previous year, part of this increase may be due to
the inclusion of TFCs and PIs as eligible institutions or that students took time to prepare for the
13

PSU, delaying their application for a year.
Table 2.1 describes students who received the benefits during the first two years of implementation. They come predominantly from public or subsidized (voucher) schools, and 70% of them
were considered ”priority students” in high school. They tend to perform better in high school
and are more likely to be first-generation students. In Figure 1.3, I ranked high schools according
to how many priority students graduated from each school and plotted the distribution of students
who received free tuition. If this rank somehow represents schools’ wealth, this graph suggests that
students receiving free education come predominantly from the middle-high income high schools.
Because higher-income students are more prepared and perform better in admission tests, many
authors argued that the policy would displace low-income students (Bucarey, 2018), creating a
”phenomenon of inverted poles,” where more affluent students access to free education while pushing lower-income students towards lower-quality, tuition-charging institutions or no college at all
Gayardon and Bernasconi (2016). This would increase educational inequalities. So far, there is no
evidence supporting this claim, and this paper is the first attempt to fill this gap.
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Table 1.1: Characteristics of Students Receiving Free Tuition
Free Tuition
(1)
Female
Priority Student
Parents with Higher Ed.
Type of School
Public
Subsidized
Private
Technical High School
Student Performance
Top 10%
Decile 2
Decile 3
Decile 4
Decile 5
Decile 6
Decile 7
Decile 8
Decile 9
Decile 10
N

Paid Tuition
(2)

0.50
0.72
0.08

0.51
0.38
0.12

0.39
0.55
0.02
0.31

0.30
0.52
0.14
0.25

0.23
0.15
0.12
0.11
0.09
0.08
0.07
0.06
0.05
0.03
77,915

0.14
0.11
0.11
0.11
0.10
0.10
0.09
0.09
0.08
0.06
555,394

Notes: Sample is composed by all student enrolled in higher education
in 2016 or 2017. I splitted the sample into two columns. Column (1)
uses all beneficiaries of free tuition. In Column (2), the universe is
those students who enrolled in higher education without free tuition.
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Figure 1.3: Distribution of students receiving free tuition based on high school wealth
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Notes: Percentiles are constructed from a ranking of high schools based on the proportion of poor students that attend
there. Poorer schools (i.e., those with a higher proportion of poor students) are in the lower percentiles. The higher
the percentile, the richer the school.

Few papers have tried to estimate the effect of this policy on college enrollment. (Bernasconi,
2019) uses a policy change in 2012 to estimate the elasticity of college enrollment and builds
a general equilibrium model to predict the effect of the free-tuition policy. He finds that free
tuition would displace low-income students to less selective programs. (Torres-Cortes, 2019) uses
a multilevel analysis to study changes in application patterns for cohorts before and after the policy.
Because she does not observe eligibility, she compares cohort effects before and after the policy,
finding that cohorts after the policy were more likely to apply to top-ranked institutions.
In Figure 1.4, I show the total enrollment among eligible and non-eligible students. The number
of eligible students going to academic programs increased while non-eligible students remained
roughly the same. As we see more eligible students enrolling in college, questions remain whether
these new students are low-ability who go to lower quality programs or high-ability, low-income
students who missed off high-quality programs before free tuition.
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Figure 1.4: Enrollment in Academic/Technical Programs Before and After the Policy by Eligibility
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Notes: Number of recent high school graduates enrolling in academic or technical programs. The enrollment increase
in academic programs for eligible students may be due to two things: an increase in financial aid application and/or an
increase in enrollment per-se.

1.3

Data and Sample

1.3.1

Data

I draw information from multiple public and restricted-access sources. First, the Department of
Education in Chile has de-identified, publicly available information on students’ enrollment and
performance at different education levels. This dataset follows students from elementary school
to higher education, storing information on enrollment, performance, and school characteristics. I
use this dataset to construct students’ high school records and college enrollment decisions. At the
high school level, the Ministry of Education identifies ”priority students” to allocate government
benefits, which I use as a proxy of poverty6 . I can identify students’ major, type of program
(technical or academic), annual enrollment, and tuition level at the college level.
I complement this data with restricted-access information from the FUAS. I know their income
6

The Ministry of Education classifies a student as priority if he meets at least one of the following criteria: a) the
student is in the government program ”Chile Solidario,´´ aimed for low-income families; b) she is among the poorest
33% of the population or; c) she is classified as very poor in the public health system
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decile for everyone who applied for financial aid, which the Department of Education uses to
allocate higher education financial aid. I use this information to identify which student was eligible
for free tuition.
The Ministry of Social Development also granted me access to the households’ income. This
information comes from the Household Social Registree (Registro Social de Hogares), an administrative database used to allocate social policies. This database collects information from different
federal ministries and agencies, such as the internal revenue services, the Ministry of Education,
the Ministry of Labor, and the Ministry of Health. The Ministry of Social Development uses this
household income information to create deciles that the Department of Education utilizes later to
define eligibility for free tuition. I have a modified version of this income because it was considered
highly sensitive.
The fourth set of information comes from the students’ college application process. I see
students’ college admission test (PSU) scores and their preference to up to ten program/institution
combinations. I construct a program quality ranking using the average PSU score in a program
among recent enrollees with this dataset.
1.3.2

Sample description

I focus on students who graduated from high school in 2012 through 2016. Because free higher
education may induce people to leave the labor market to enroll in college, I restrict my analysis to
immediate enrollment after high school graduation. For this same reason, I drop adult-education
high schools.
One million two hundred thousand students graduated from high school between 2012 and
2016, and 60% of them took the PSU and filled the FUAS right after high school graduation. Table
1 show descriptive statistics of all students who graduated high school between these years. Those
who filled the FUAS were more likely to graduate from a public or voucher school, and perform
better in high school and the PSU. Priority students, which I use as a proxy of being poor, are more
likely to fill the FUAS and being eligible for free tuition. Around 50% of eligible students were
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considered priority the year they graduated, and 91% of priority students were eligible. I construct
deciles of schools based on the proportion of priority students in a school. Using the proportion
of priority students in a school, I create deciles of schools where the lower deciles have a higher
proportion and are thus considered poorer schools. Table 1.2 show that eligible students come
predominantly from the middle-lower deciles and usually have lower PSU scores.
Table 1.3 compares students before and after the policy implementation. I use cohorts 2013
and 2014 as the before sample and 2015 and 2016 as the after. The number of students filling
the FUAS increased by 8% the years after the policy. Both the eligible and non-eligible groups
expanded by two percentage points. This suggests two things. First, this policy induced students to
apply for financial aid, and second, students did not know their eligibility status before applying.
Otherwise, we would expect an increase primarily in eligible students.

1.4

Empirical Strategy

Because financial aid is correlated with many observable and unobservable characteristics that
also affect college choices, identification is usually challenging in this context. To overcome this
problem, several papers studying the effect of financial aid policies in the U.S. used a differencein-difference approach (Dynarski, 2000; Dynarski, 2003; Andrews, DesJardins, and Ranchhod,
2010; Bartik, Hershbein, and Lachowska, 2015; Carruthers and Fox, 2016; Page et al., 2018) or
a Regression Discontinuity Design (Denning, 2019; DesJardins and McCall, 2014; Hoxby and
Bulman, 2016; Page et al., 2019). In this paper, I use both strategies.
1.4.1

Regression discontinuity design

I exploit the sharp discontinuity of students’ eligibility for free tuition. This allows me to compare
students just above the 50% threshold to those just below it. If college choice is a continuous
function of family income, then the only difference between these students is that for some of
them, college prices dropped significantly.
I use a fuzzy regression discontinuity design because students may appeal the original decision
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Table 1.2: Summary Statistics. High school graduating cohort of 2012 to 2016
All

FUAS

Eligible

Non-eligible

Female
Avg. GPA
Priority
Type of school
Public
Subsidized
Private

0.510
5.640
0.415

0.548
5.767
0.409

0.563
5.735
0.496

0.504
5.862
0.154

0.358
0.516
0.086

0.342
0.569
0.050

0.382
0.553
0.020

0.223
0.615
0.141

Tech. High School
Regular High School
School Priority Deciles
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

0.325
0.674

0.290
0.710

0.334
0.666

0.158
0.841

0.074
0.096
0.115
0.117
0.127
0.114
0.114
0.100
0.075
0.069

0.064
0.084
0.106
0.111
0.126
0.122
0.129
0.129
0.090
0.038

0.079
0.101
0.124
0.126
0.139
0.129
0.125
0.109
0.058
0.011

0.020
0.036
0.053
0.068
0.089
0.103
0.141
0.189
0.185
0.117

491.101

495.964

481.596

535.968

0.170
0.323
0.123

0.252
0.450
0.144

0.280
0.400
0.199

0.167
0.599
0.000

1,200,553

716,685

536,070

180,585

PSU Score
College Enrollment
Tech. Program
Acad. Program
Free-tuition
N

Notes: Sample is composed by high school students who graduated between 2012 and 2016.
School priority deciles are based on the proportion of priority (poor) students in the school. Lower
priority deciles identifies poorer schools. Statistics are taken for the first year after high school
graduation.
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Table 1.3: Student Characteristics by Eligibility Status, Before and After the Policy
Eligible
Before
Female
GPA
Priority
Type of school
public
subsidized
private
PSU Score
College Enrollment
Tech. Program
Acad. Program
N

Non-eligible

After

Before

After

0.562
5.726
0.541

0.562
5.770
0.476

0.504
5.884
0.154

0.504
5.868
0.158

0.380
0.555
0.020

0.386
0.551
0.019

0.213
0.629
0.140

0.235
0.600
0.141

481.3

481.9

542.6

529.2

0.290
0.397

0.272
0.401

0.168
0.640

0.167
0.552

209,874

223,655

65,888

80,645

Notes: Eligible students are those bellow the 50% income threshold. Sample is restricted to students who filled the FUAS, because only for them I have eligibility information. I use cohort 2013 and 2014 as the “Before” sample, and cohorts 2015 and
2016 as the “After” sample.

by showing evidence of income that contradicts the Ministry of Social Development’s original
ranking. Besides, the Ministry of Education may change eligibility status when they receive new
income information. This means that my running variable does not perfectly identify eligibility,
and some students who are above the threshold may end up being eligible.
Figure 1.5 shows the proportion of eligible students by bins of the running variable. There is
a clear discontinuity at the threshold, providing important exogenous variation in the eligibility
status of a student.
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Figure 1.5: Discontinuity of Eligibility at the Threshold for the 2017 High School Cohort
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Notes: Students in 2016 high school cohort are grouped by bins of 0.01 standard deviations of the running variable.
Each point represent the proportion of students in each bin that is eligible (panel A) or received free tuition (panel B).

Exploiting this discontinuity, in the first stage, I run a regression of eligibility using the corrected household income as the running variable, and the 50% threshold as the discontinuity.

eligi = Xi βc + γ1,c Si + γ2 1(Si < 0) + f (S) + βXi + ui,c

(1.1)

Where, eligi indicates whether the student was eligible according to FUAS information, and Si
is household income, normalized to be zero at the cutoff and having a standard deviation of unity,
and f (S) is a flexible functional form of income.
The second stage uses the first stage results to run the following linear probability model for
each outcome of interest
ˆ i + γ2 1(Si < 0) + f (S) + βXi + ui
yi = Xi βc + γ1 elig

(1.2)

Where yic is the outcome of interest, for example, choosing a technical program. The parameter of
interest is γ1 that represents the difference in the outcome of interest induced by the policy.
I use cohort 2015 and 2016 to run separate regressions and I restrict my sample to a bandwidth
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selected using Calonico et al. (2017) method. Nevertheless, I estimate these models for different
bandwidths for robustness check.
One potential threat to identification is score manipulation by students. In Figure 1.6, I show
that the density of students is smooth at the cutoff for cohort 2016, suggesting there is no manipulation at the threshold. To test this, I perform a Maccrary test of manipulation of the running
variable. Consistent with Figure 1.6, I fail to reject the null hypothesis of no manipulation, at the
threshold. On the other hand, cohort 2015 shows some signs of potential manipulation, which limits the validity of a regression discontinuity design. For this reason, I will focus mostly on cohort
2016 in the main results.
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Figure 1.6: Manipulation of Running Variable
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Notes: Students are grouped by bins of 0.01 standard deviations of the running variable. Each point represent the
number of students in each bin for 2015 high school cohort (panel A) and 2016 high school cohort (panel B). Whenever
the household’s income was missing or inconsistent across administrative records, the Ministry of Social Development
assigned a decile based on a set of variables that reflect long-term household income. When assigned to a decile,
they were given the highest income in that decile. In 2017, the Ministry of Social Development had a larger set of
administrative records, reducing the need to use imputing values.

1.4.2

Difference in difference approach and distributional effects

Despite the strengths RD presents for identifying causal effects, one main drawback is the limited
inference it provides for students distant from the selection margin. Hence, to study the distributional effects of free tuition, I use a Difference-in-Difference approach (DID). Comparing eligible
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to non-eligible students before and after the policy, controls for unobservable, time-invariant characteristics of eligible and non-eligible students, as well as time-variant characteristics that affect
all students.
The main assumptions behind a DID approach are parallel pre-trends and no confounding
changes in the treatment (or control) group at the time of the policy implementation. In other
words, we assume that the difference between the treatment and control group would have remained constant in the absence of the policy. This assumption may be particularly troubling when
information comes from financial aid applications. Because we only see students who decided
to apply, unobservable characteristics may be affecting both financial aid decisions and college
choice. If the policy induced more price-sensitive students to apply, then the sample before and
after the policy would differ significantly, which may bias the results.
It is difficult to sign this potential bias a priori. On the one hand, if only eligible students
reacted by filling the FUAS, the proportion of enrollees may drop in the treatment group, even
if total enrollment increased. In this case, the results will underestimate the effect of the policy.
On the other hand, as students do not know their eligibility status – nor the eligibility cutoff –
when filling the FUAS, we may expect both the control and treatment group to expand their FUAS
application. In fact, both the treatment and control group increased by about two percentage points,
which represents a 6% in the treatment group and almost 10% in the control group, as shown in
Figure 1.7. Because induced students are more price-sensitive than always takers, many in the
control group will decide not to enroll once they know their eligibility status. In this case, we
would be overestimating the effect of the policy. Which effect is larger is an empirical question,
and the magnitude of the potential bias will depend on how much the policy affected the decision
to complete the FUAS. The main challenge is, then, to correct this self-selection.
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Figure 1.7: Proportion of Students Filling FUAS over Time
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Notes: Sample is high school graduates students. A high school cohort is defined by the year the student exit high
school. Students enroll in college the year after high school graduation. The policy was implemented in 2016, which
means the first cohort to be affected was cohort 2015. Panel (a) show an increase in the proportion of students applying
for financial aid after the policy implementation. Panel (b) shows the proportion of eligible and non-eligible students
over the total of high school graduates

1.4.2.1

Selection model

To solve this issue, the main approach in this paper explicitly models the probability of filling
the FUAS as a function of the policy and jointly estimates this probability and students’ college
choices, controlling for unobserved factors that affect both decisions. This approach uses a classical sample selection model (Heckman, 1979) consistent of two equations: The selection equation
that captures the decision to fill the FUAS, and the choice equation, which models students’ college decisions. Both decisions are correlated through an unobserved factor that I estimate using an
Expectation-Maximization (EM) algorithm.

Selection equation. When modeling the probability of filling the FUAS, I capture the effect of the
policy by including cohort fixed effects and their interaction with several student and high school
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characteristics. The self-selection equation is given by

F U AS = (Xi β1 + Si β2 ) ×

1+

2016
X

!
γm Cm

+ δr + νik

(1.3)

m=2012

Here, X contains students’ characteristics, such as whether she was a priority student, their high
school and middle school GPA, GPA ranking, and their sex. High school characteristics are collected in S. Here, I include the proportion of priority students and the type of high school (private,
charter, or public). Cm and δr are cohort and regional fixed effects, respectively.
Choice equation. The second equation captures the effect of the policy on students’ decisions to
enroll in college and the type of program they choose. For student i in cohort m, the latent utility
of choosing option c, conditional on having filled the FUAS, is

yim,c = Xi βc + γ1,c Ti +

2016
X

[γ2m,c Cim + γ3m,k (Ti × Cim )] + δr + ik

(1.4)

m=2012

Where y is the latent utility of choosing option c in the outcome of interest7 , the first year
after their high school graduation. Student-specific characteristics, in X, include high school GPA,
GPA ranking, sex, attendance rate, priority status, and if they attended a public, charter, or private
school. The treatment variable, Ti , takes the value of 1 if the student is below the fifth decile and
zero otherwise. Cim are dummies for the year of high school graduation. Regional fixed effects
are captured by δr . The parameter of interest here is γ3 , the difference between the control and
treatment group in cohort m, compared to the baseline cohort of 2014, the cohort just before the
policy implementation.
The error terms in (1.3) and (1.4),  and ν, are assumed to be correlated through a single factor,
7
The main outcomes of interest are the type of program they choose (technical, academic, or no college) and the
quality of the program
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η, that captures unobserved heterogeneity affecting both financial aid and college decisions.

i = ρ ηi + ui,
νi = ρν ηi + ui,ν

Estimation. From equation (1.3) and (1.4), I estimate the likelihood function specified in Appendix B using an Expectation-Maximization (EM) algorithm that includes unobserved heterogeneity affecting both the probability of completing the FUAS and college choices.
I approximate the unobserved heterogeneity, η, to represent different types of students, and
perform the estimation using 4, 6, and 8 types. This avoids imposing distributional assumptions
on the latent factor (Mroz, 1999). The EM algorithm procedure is explained in Appendix C.

Identification and Assumptions. The main assumption in this selection model is the conditional
independence of eligibility and the probability of filling the FUAS. Because students do not know
their eligibility status when filling the FUAS, they can only imperfectly approximate the probability of being eligible. By interacting the cohort fixed effects with students’ characteristics, I
am modeling the selection into FUAS as a function of the expected benefits the student may get.
Students self-select based on their probability of being eligible and not on eligibility per-se. This,
which implies conditional independence between eligibility and FUAS, is consistent with Figure
1.7, which shows that both eligible and non-eligible students increased their FUAS application,
suggesting they can only imperfectly approximate their eligibility.
Identification in this model comes from its nonlinear structure and the use of exclusion restrictions (Wooldridge, 2010). I use the interaction between student characteristics and cohort fixed
effects as exclusion restrictions. For identification, I need these student characteristics to influence
the probability of filling the FUAS differently before and after the policy while having a constant
effect on college choice, after controlling for eligibility and unobserved heterogeneity. Furthermore, the assumed functional forms in the error terms, conditional on unobserved heterogeneity,
provide additional identification of the model (Heckman, 1979; Mroz and Savage, 2006).
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1.4.2.2

Alternative Strategy: High School Level Variation

Because causal identification depends on some behavioral assumptions, I provide an alternative
strategy where none of these assumptions need to hold. Instead of using eligibility status, I use
school-level information to rank schools based on how poor/rich they are. I then compare students
in poorer schools to students in wealthier schools before and after the policy. This allows me to
compare every student who finished high school and not only those who filled the FUAS.
Using “priority student” as a proxy for being poor, I create deciles of high schools according
to the proportion of priority students who graduated from each high school. The lowest decile
represents the poorest 10% of high schools, i.e., those with the highest proportion of priority students. The intuition behind this approach is that students in poorer schools are more exposed to
the policy than students in wealthier schools. Furthermore, this approach captures peer effects
and other school-level effects that may influence students’ decisions (Perna, 2006, Bank, 2012,
Torres-Cortes, 2019).
Table C2 shows that almost 90% of students in the poorest schools were eligible for free tuition,
while in the richest school decile, only 5.6% were. This shows there is enough variation in exposure
to the policy among the constructed school deciles.
The main specification is as follows. For student i, in cohort m and in school decile j, the latent
utility of choosing option c is

yimj,c = Xi1 βc + Si1 δ1,c +

9
X

δ2j,c Dsj

+ δ3m,c Cim +

j=1

9
X

γjm,c (Dsj × Cim ) + δr + I,c

(1.5)

j=1

Where Cim is a dummy indicating if the student was in cohort m, and Dsj indicates if school
s was in decile j. I use cohort 2014, and schools in the tenth (richest) decile, as the baseline.
Therefore, γjm shows changes in enrollment patterns for students in school decile j, relative to the
richest decile, in cohort m compared to cohort 2014.
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1.5

Results

When making the transition to tertiary education, high school students face many sources of uncertainty that influence their decision to enroll in college. They must further choose if they enroll
in technical or academic programs, or between a more selective, more expensive program, or a less
expensive, less selective one. In this section, I present results on the effect of free tuition on two
different outcomes: access to higher education and college quality.
I use two different quasi-experimental approaches: a Regression Discontinuity Design and a
Difference-in-Difference approach. Using RD allows me to estimate the effect for students at the
margin of being eligible, while the DID provides the opportunity to get the distributional effects of
the policy.
1.5.1

Effects for student at the margin

I start with the results from the regression discontinuity design for students at the margin of being
eligible.

1.5.1.1

Access to higher education and college choice

Figure 1.8 shows the relation between family per capita income and college enrollment. As family
income increases, the chances of enrolling in academic programs increases. The discontinuity at
the threshold is interpreted as the causal effect of free tuition on college enrollment for students at
that margin.
These results are quantified in Table 1.4. Panel A shows that eligible students were 2.6 percentage points more likely to attend an academic program, and 2.7 less likely to enroll in a technical
program for cohort 2015, when only academic programs were free. For cohort 2016, where both
academic and technical programs where free, enrollment in any college increased by 2.1 percentage points, driven by an increase in both technical and academic programs.
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Figure 1.8: The Effect of Free Tuition on College Choice. Regression Discontinuity Design
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Notes: Students in 2016 high school cohort are grouped by bins of 0.01 standard deviations of the running variable.
Each point represent the proportion of students in each bin that enrolled in any college, technical programs and academic programs. The line represents a nonparametric estimation of the correlation between income and the relevant
outome.

Despite the magnitude of the effects, these are not statistically significant, suggesting there is
important variation around the cutoff. In table 1.5, I expand the bandwidth for the local regression,
in doing so, these effects get larger as we start capturing the enrollment trend of poorer students.
Considering that students had little space to manipulate their income, this suggests that the effects
are larger for lower-income students, who are usually more susceptible to financial aid.
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Table 1.4: The Effect of Free Tuition on College Choice for Students at the Margin
First Stage
Eligible
A. Cohort 2015
Eligible
N
B. Cohort 2016
Eligible
N

Second Stage
College

Technical
Program

Academic
Program

0.641***
(0.008)
21,516

-0.001
(0.020)

-0.027
(0.017)

0.026
(0.018)

0.815***
(0.006)
36,243

0.021
(0.014)

0.006
(0.011)

0.015
(0.012)

Note: Different regressions were fitted for each outcome. Coefficients show the discontinuity
at the threshold, using household income as the running variable. The dependent variable in
the first stage is the final eligibility status used by the Department of Education to allocate freetuition. The second stage uses a linear probability model to estimate the effect of being eligible
on the type of program students choose. I use an optimal bandwidth of 0.24 standard deviations
from the cutoff, for cohort 2016, and 0.2 standard deviations for cohort 2015. These optimal
bandwidth were calculated using Calonico et al. (2017).
Standard errors are in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.5: Regression Discontinuity Robustness Check to Bandwidth Selection
Any College

Technical
Program

Optimal Bandwidth: 0.24 SD from cutoff
Eligible
0.0198
0.0044
(0.0134)
(0.0109)
N
36,243
36,243
Bandwidth: .35 SD from cutoff
Eligible
0.0477***
0.0127
(0.0110)
(0.00884)
N
54,102
54,102
Bandwidth: .4 SD from cutoff
Eligible
0.0480***
0.0110
(0.0104)
(0.0084)
N
59,533
59,533

Academic
Program
0.0154
(0.0120)
36,243
0.0349***
(0.00982)
54,102
0.0369***
(0.0094)
59,533

Note: Different regressions were fitted for each outcome. Each panel
uses a different bandwidth for the local regression. All panels use a
linear regression with different slope to the left and right of the cutoff
Standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

1.5.2

The distributional effects of free tuition

Because the previous results cannot be extended to lower-income students, I now focus on the
difference-in-difference estimations, where I can identify the distributional effects of the Chilean
free-tuition policy.

1.5.2.1

College choice

Table 1.6 shows the effect of the policy on three outcomes: no college, enrollment in technical
programs, and enrollment in academic programs. I present the coefficients for the two first cohorts
affected by the policy. For cohort 2015, only academic programs were free, while for cohort 2016
both technical and academic programs were eligible for free tuition. The policy induced students
to enroll in both technical and academic programs, by 2.3 and 5.6 percentage points, respectively,
when both programs were free. For cohort 2015, enrollment in any college experienced a smaller
increase compared to cohort 2016, and almost half of the expansion in academic programs came
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from students leaving technical college. This difference suggests low-income students were less
prepared (or motivated) for college, and including technical education expanded their opportunities
to access higher education.
Panels B - D of table 1.6 use subsamples of economically disadvantaged and high-achieving
students. In Panel B I restrict my sample of eligible students to those in the bottom 40% of income. Enrollment in any college increased by 8.6 percentage points (20.8%) and 7 percentage
points (32%) in academic programs, for cohort 2016. These estimates are much larger than for
the average student, which may suggest two different things. First, these students may have lowerexpected returns to education and thus, enrolled in college when costs were lower; or second, they
face higher economic constraints, and taking loans was not a viable option. In contrast, students
in the middle of the distribution experienced a moderate effect on academic enrollment. Interestingly, in the 2015 cohort, these students were 1 percentage point less likely to attend any college.
Although this effect is not statistically significant, this may suggest some middle-income students
were displaced by lower-income, high-achieving students. In the 2016 cohort, when less selective institutions were included, college enrollment increased by 1.2 percentage points for these
students.
In Panel D, I use a subsample of students who ranked in the top 20% GPA in high school.
These students were 6.3 percentage points more likely to attend any college, and many of those
induced to enroll in an academic program would have gone to a technical college in the absence of
the policy. The larger effect on academic programs, compared to the average student, shows that
high skill students, who have higher expected returns to education, were more likely to move in
the technical-academic margin when education was free.
Figure 1.10 shows the enrollment change in free and non-free institutions. Using the 2014
cohort as the baseline comparison, Figure 1.10 shows that eligible students were 10.3 percentage
points more likely to enroll in a free academic program. Of those, around 50% would have enrolled
in a non-free academic program in the absence of the policy.
Despite this shift into free academic programs, there is no evidence of lower-income students
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Table 1.6: The Effect of Free Tuition on College Choice. Difference-in-Difference Results With
Correction for Self-Selection
No college
(1)
A. All Students
Eligible × C2015

-0.0397***
(0.0034)
Eligible × C2016
-0.0732***
(0.0036)
[0.331]
B. Students in the bottom 40% (Low Income)
Eligible × C2015
-0.0481***
(0.0037)
Eligible × C2016
-0.0853***
(0.0037)
[0.343]
C. Students between 40 and 50%
Eligible × C2015
-0.00208
(0.0056)
Eligible × C2016
-0.0249***
(0.0056)
[0.258]
D. High-Achieving Students
Eligible × C2015
-0.0402***
(0.00667)
Eligible × C2016
-0.0624***
(0.00667)
[0.220]
E. Low-income, High-Achieving Students
Eligible × C2015
-0.0482***
(0.0070)
Eligible × C2016
-0.0733***
(0.0070)
[0.230]

Technical Program
(2)

Academic
Program
(3)

-0.0092***
(0.0031)
0.0048
(0.0031)
[0.269]

0.0489***
(0.0039)
0.0684***
(0.0039)
[0.400]

-0.0061*
(0.0031)
0.0078**
(0.0031)
[0.273]

0.0542***
(0.0040)
0.0775***
(0.0041)
[0.383]

-0.0202***
(0.0038)
-0.0066*
(0.0038)
[0.242]

0.0222***
(0.0062)
0.0315***
(0.0062)
[0.500]

-0.0230***
(0.00499)
-0.0129**
(0.00511)
[0.186]

0.0632***
(0.00765)
0.0753***
(0.00770)
[0.593]

-0.0232***
(0.0051)
-0.0146***
(0.0053)
[0.194]

0.0714***
(0.0080)
0.0879***
(0.0080)
[0.576]

Note: Estimates come from the interaction of cohort fixed effects and eligibility status in a multinomial logit model, after controlling selection into financial aid application. I use cohort 2014 as
the baseline cohort. I present the results for the two cohorts after the policy implementation, cohort 2015 (C2015 ) and cohort 2016 (C2016 ). Panel A uses every student who finished high school
between 2012 and 2016. Panel B restricts the sample ef eligible students tot hose in the lowest
40% of the income distribution. Panel C uses students between the 40 and 50% of the distribution.
Panel D focus on students who graduated with the top 20% GPA in their cohort. Panel E uses
students below the poorest 40% and in the top 20% GPA in their high school cohort. For each
panel, I run a separate selection models with the respective sample.
Bootstrap standard errors are in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Figure 1.9: The Effect of Free Tuition on College Choice. Difference-in-Difference Approach
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shaded area represent the 95% confidence interval. Eligible students increased their enrollment in academic programs
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Figure 1.10: Enrollment Change in Free and Non-Free Institutions. Difference-in-Difference Approach

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

High School Cohort
Free Institutions

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

High School Cohort

Non-Free Institutions

Free Institutions

(a) Technical Program

Non-Free Institutions

(b) Academic Program

Notes: Each point represent the coefficient of the interaction between the cohort fixed effect and eligibility status.
The shaded area represent the 95% confidence interval. Coefficients come from a multinomial logit with 5 different
choices: no college, technical program in free institution, technical in non-free institutions, academic program in free
institution, and academic program in non-free institutions.

being crowded-out of college. In fact, the effect on low-income students did not change when
free tuition was expanded to the poorest 60%, in 2017. Despite including richer students in the
policy, we do not see a displacement of poorer students towards lower-quality or tuition-charging
institutions.
Because these results may be sensitive to behavioral assumptions, I present multiple robustness checks and alternative strategies in Appendix B. Results consistently show that lower-income
students were more likely to enroll in any college after the policy implementation.
Together, these results suggest that access to higher education is conditioned by economic
constraints, and providing free tuition induced low-income, high achieving students to enroll in
academic programs in place of technical education. Students who were not high-achievers also
experienced a significant enrollment gain in college-going, especially when technical education
was available for free.
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1.5.2.2

College quality

I now examine the distributional effect of free-tuition policies on access to selective programs. I
ranked programs based on the average PSU score of admitted students, and estimate the probability
of enrolling in a top-tier program. To simplify the estimation, I group programs into 4 tiers: top
20%, 20-40%, 40-60%, and bottom 40%.
Table 1.7 shows enrollment changes in programs across these tiers. Column (1) shows institutions in the top 20%, while column (4) represents those least selective programs. Panel (A) of
Table1.7 suggest eligible students were more likely to attend programs in the top 20%. In the 2015
cohort, enrollment in top-ranked programs was partly driven by a decline in lower-ranked programs, while in the 2016 cohort, when less selective institutions were included, enrollment grew
across the whole ranking distribution.
Table 1.7 also shows important heterogeneity by students’ skills. High-achieving students,
shown in panel C), were 6 percentage points more likely to attend a top-ranked program after
the policy took place. This is twice as large as for the average student, suggesting that students
with higher expected returns to college were not attending selective programs when tuition was in
place8 .

Conclusion
In 2016, Chile waived tuition in selected higher education institutions for the poorest 50% of
the population. Because there were no academic requirements and the policy affected families
from a wide range in income distribution, this massive change in college prices provides a unique
opportunity to study the distributional effect of free college.
I use different strategies to estimate the effect of this free-tuition policy on students’ decisions
to attend college and the type of college they choose. A fuzzy regression discontinuity approach
shows that for the median-income student, this policy had a small and statistically insignificant
effect on college-going. The effect was higher as I expanded the bandwidth for the local regression.
8

A a reference, programs in the top 20% cost twice as much than programs in the bottom 40%
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Table 1.7: The Effect of Free tuition on Access to Selective Programs. Difference-in-Difference
Approach With Correction for Self-Selection
Enrollment
Top 20%
(1)

20 - 40%
(2)

40 - 60%
(3)

60 -100%
(4)

0.0365***
(0.00290)
0.0422***
(0.00296)
[0.186]

0.0183***
(0.00275)
0.0129***
(0.00276)
[0.104]

-0.00477*
(0.00284)
0.0120***
(0.00297)
[0.137]

-0.0136***
(0.00376)
0.00381
(0.00372)
[0.242]

0.0395***
(0.00305)
0.0471***
(0.00312)
[0.173]

0.0204***
(0.00287)
0.0161***
(0.00289)
[0.100]

-0.00334
(0.00293)
0.0128***
(0.00307)
[0.135]

-0.0115***
(0.00386)
0.00660*
(0.00381)
[0.247]

0.0646***
(0.00726)
Eligible ×C2016
0.0641***
(0.00729)
[0.399]
D. Low-income, High Skill Students
Eligible ×C2015
0.0683***
(0.00754)
Eligible ×C2016
0.0706***
(0.00759)
[0.380]

0.0160***
(0.00550)
0.0102*
(0.00538)
[0.103]

-0.0148***
(0.00524)
-0.00320
(0.00555)
[0.115]

-0.0297***
(0.00647)
-0.0123*
(0.00655)
[0.163]

0.0182***
(0.00569)
0.0132**
(0.00556)
[0.103]

-0.0124**
(0.00537)
-0.00266
(0.00570)
[0.116]

-0.0296***
(0.00662)
-0.0114*
(0.00670)
[0.170]

A. All
Eligible ×C2015
Eligible ×C2016

B. Students in Bottom 40%
Eligible ×C2015
Eligible ×C2016

C. High Skill Students
Eligible ×C2015

Notes: Coefficients come from a multinomial logit model using the ranking of the program were the
student enrolled/applied as dependent variable. I split this ranking into 4 categories: top 20%, between
20-40%, 40-60%, and bottom 40%. Not shown in the results is the effect on any-college, to which all these
coefficients should add up. I show the results for the first two cohorts after the policy implementation,
suing cohort 2014 as the baseline. Panel A uses every student who finished high school between 2012 and
2016. Panel B restrict the sample to students in the lowest 40% of the income distribution.Panel D focus
on students who graduated in the top 20% in their cohort. For each panel, I run a separate selection model.
Outcome means for the relevant baseline subsample are shown in square brackets.
Bootstrap standard errors are in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Students were between 1.5 and 3.3 percentage points more likely to attend college, depending on
the bandwidth used. Consistent with these results, a difference-in-difference approach using only
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students in the middle of the income distribution, shows that these students increased their overall
enrollment by 2.5 percentage points and their enrollment in academic programs by 3.1 percentage
points.
The Difference-in-Difference approach allows us to use the full income distribution and, thus,
focus on the distributional effects of free tuition. Results show important heterogeneity by income
level. In the preferred strategy, that corrects for self-selection into applying for financial aid, I
find a 7.3 percentage points increase in total enrollment and a 6.9 percentage points increase in
academic programs for eligible students. This represents a 10% and 18% increase from the respective baseline. This effect was higher for students facing larger economic constraints (i.e. lower
income), who were more likely to attend both technical and academic programs.
Furthermore, the largest effect was found for low-income, high-achieving students. Although
these students were more likely to attend college in the absence of the policy, many decided to
forgo technical programs to enroll in academic, more expensive, more selective programs. This
is consistent with the idea that lower-income students are under-matched because of tuition levels
(Hoxby and Avery, 2013).
Using an alternative strategy where I exploit high-school level variation in the proportion of
poor students in the high school, I find similar results: students in the poorest schools were more
likely to enroll in both technical and academic programs.
These results are consistent with several estimations examining financial aid policies in the
United States. Similar to Page et al. (2018) and Bartik, Hershbein, and Lachowska (2015) estimates, I find an 11-percentage point enrollment increase at eligible, four-year (academic) institutions, placing this policy at the higher-end of the literature on the effect of financial aid on college
enrollment. In contrast to Page et al. (2018), who examines a merit-based program, and in line
with Bartik, Hershbein, and Lachowska (2015), who examines a place-based program, I find that
this increase in enrollment was driven mostly by lower-income students.
Methodologically, this paper emphasizes the fact that local regressions, such as RDD, hide
important heterogeneity that should be considered when evaluating policies. Taking this paper as
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an example, RDD results suggest small effects on college-going, while DID, which uses the whole
set of eligible students, shows significant and large effects. The main reason for this difference is
that median-income students had significantly smaller effects than their lower-income counterparts.
Given that students’ skill is also a source of heterogeneity, this issue is a problem whether selection
is based on income or test scores.
I also show that Difference-in-Difference estimations using information from financial aid applications, may be biased if the policy affected students’ financial aid decisions, and estimations
should include a correction for this self-selection. Comparing the standard DID and the selfselection corrected, we find a non-trivial bias of around 1.2 percentage points (17%) for enrollment
in academic programs.
This paper does not attempt to provide a thorough evaluation of the Chilean policy. Instead,
it is limited to show that low-income students face economic constraints even in the absence of
credit constraints. This is consistent with the presence of decreasing absolute risk aversion in the
investment in education. Results in this paper are a small piece in the puzzle that is free-tuition
policies in developing countries, and further work is needed to fully understand the benefits and
costs of free tuition.
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Chapter 2
Free Tuition in Chile: Who Benefits and Where Do They Go?
2.1

Introduction

In 2016, after a series of student marches demanding free higher education and amid a considerable
political and social upheaval, the Chilean government eliminated fees in public universities for a
portion of the population. This benefit was intended for the poorest 50% of the country, with the
commitment to gradually advance towards universal free tuition.
The purpose of this policy was, on the one hand, to alleviate the student debt that plagued
many families and, on the other, to improve access to college for vulnerable students. It is in this
last objective where most of the debate still holds. Many have argued that higher-income students
would benefit the most from free tuition as they tend to be better prepared for college admission
tests and may end up displacing vulnerable students toward lower-quality programs, exacerbating
the inequality in access to higher education.
This study aims to take the first step to understand how free tuition affected the decisions and
well-being of the most vulnerable students. I show that the beneficiaries of the policy concentrate in middle to low-income neighborhoods, and they were more likely to graduate from public
schools, but not from the most vulnerable ones. In 2016, when the policy only included academic
programs, beneficiaries were mostly high-performance students. On average, they scored over
one standard deviations above the average score in the college admission test. When the policy
was extended to Professional Institutes and Technical Formation Centers (technical programs), the
proportion of more vulnerable students grew significantly, suggesting greater democratization of
higher education.
There is an evident heterogeneity regarding which programs choose students who received free
tuition. While more affluent students tend to go to more selective programs, those who attend
technical education tend to come from more vulnerable backgrounds. Much of this is due to
differences in performance on the college admission test. However, free tuition allowed low-
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income and high-performance students to access selective programs, which tend to have higher
expected returns. This helps reduce the mismatch between the skills of vulnerable students and the
program’s quality in which they enroll.

2.2

Access to Higher Education in Chile

Access to higher education in Chile has grown considerably in the last 15 years (Espinoza and
Urzua, 2015), accompanied by a reduction in the gap between rich and poor students. This reduction is partly explained by the increase in the supply of programs and the creation of new
Universities, Technical Formation Centers, and Professional Institutes. Graph 2.1 shows the number of students who enroll in college each year, based on the type of college they attended. The
proportion of students enrolled in college who graduated from public schools has been steadily
increasing in the last decade. Similarly, when we rank schools according to the proportion of
poor students they serve, the same pattern is observed: Poorer schools have gained participation in
higher education over the years.
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Figure 2.1: Number of Students Enrolled in Higher Education by Type of High School
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Notes: County percentiles are constructed from the per capita county income. The graph only uses students who
scored 600 or above in the PSU. In each bin, I show the proportion of students who enrolled in a highly selective
program.

42

Although access for low-income students has improved over time, there are still significant
barriers that determine the type of programs they choose and the quality of the institutions they
attend. In graph 2.2, I redo graph 2.1 differentiating by type of program. Now, we can observe
that a large part of the convergence between poor and richer students is due to an increase in
enrollment in technical programs, which usually have lower returns (Espinoza and Urzua, 2015).
This difference in the type of programs students choose based on their socioeconomic status invites
us to ask why and how different policies can alter this trend.
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Figure 2.2: Number of Students Enrolled in Higher Education by Type of High School
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Notes: County percentiles are constructed from the per capita county income. Psu scores are groups in buns of 20
points (0.16 standard deviations). Panel a) shows students who took the PSU in 2016. Panel b) show students who
took the PSU IN 2017

Part of the difference can be explained by a gap in preparation for the college admission test.
Chile uses a centralized admission test called Prueba de Selección Universitaria (PSU), consisting
of three parts: math, language, and Science. The final score is normalized to centered at 500 with
a standard deviation of 120. Most universities use this score as the main criteria in their selection
process. The other components used are high school grades and ranking, which are weighted
less than the test score 1 . Students from less affluent backgrounds tend to score lower than their
wealthier peers. Graph 2.3 shows the correlation between county income per capita and the average
1

The specific weight depends on each Career and University
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PSU score of the commune. The richer the county, the better the scores obtained in the PSU.
Figure 2.3: Distribution of Students Enrolling in Highly Selective Programs by County Wealth and
PSU Score

Notes: County percentiles are constructed from the per capita county income. The graph only uses students who
scored 600 or above in the PSU. In each bin, I show the proportion of students who enrolled in a highly selective
program.

This correlation has founded the main doubts and criticisms of free-tuition programs. If it is
the wealthiest students who have the greatest probability of accessing College, they would be the
ones who benefit the most from free tuition. As richer students decide to attend more selective
programs because of free tuition, they may end up displacing the most vulnerable students towards
less selective, lower-return programs.
On the other hand, lower-income students face economic constraints that could divert them
from choosing more expensive programs towards lower-risk, lower expected-returns options. As
education is a risky investment, economic theory predicts that poorer, risk-averse students are
less likely to invest in high-return, high-risk college programs than their richer peers, even in the
absence of credit constraints and with similar expected-returns2 .
Various studies evaluating programs that increase access to credit in Chile and the United States
show the existence of financial restrictions that affect students’ decisions to attend higher education
2

This is consistent with the theory of decreasing absolute risk aversion.
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and the types of programs they choose (Solis, 2017; Aguirre, 2019; Bucarey, Contreras, and Munoz
Henriquez, 2020). Other studies that analyze different types of monetary support for vulnerable
families find similar results (Castro-Zarzur, 2018; Rosa Castro-Zarzur and Sarzosa, 2019). For example, Castro-Zarzur (2018) estimates that the Teacher’s Vocation Scholarship, which granted free
tuition in education programs in Chile, was successful in attracting skilled, low-income students.
In the United States, similar results confirm that the most vulnerable students are more susceptible
to changing their decisions when they receive monetary support.
In a related literature, Hoxby and Avery (2013) argue the existence of a gap in the matching
of Universities and poor students. They find that low-income students tend to go to less selective
programs even when they present the same academic performance as their more affluent peers. The
authors venture to explain this gap for reasons of asymmetries of information, expectations, or economic restrictions. Regarding the latter, the state-guaranteed loan in Chile, which increased access
to credit for low-income students, has managed to expand opportunities for the most vulnerable
students (Solis, 2017). Nevertheless, despite having access to credits, one still wonders if there
is still a gap between the program that students choose and those they should access according to
their academic performance.
Graph 2.3 shows the proportion of students who attend higher education based to their PSU
score and the county where they lived when they graduated from high school. The counties are
ranked from poorest to richest, using county per capita income. Focusing on the cohort that took
the PSU in 2014, I show how students with a similar PSU score make different decisions depending
on the county they reside in. Graph 2.3 shows the proportion of students in each cell that enrolled
in a highly selective program 3 . The most affluent counties located at the top of the graph are
Las Condes, Vitacura, Santiago, Viña del Mar, and Providencia. Among the counties with the
lowest per capita income are San Pedro de la Paz, Temuco, Puente Alto, Maipú and Lo Espejo.
This graph suggests that a student who scored 640 points (about one standard deviation above the
average) in one of the wealthiest counties has the same probability of enrolling in a highly selective
3

I define selectivity based on the average PSU score of admitted students
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program as a student who scored 720 points (just under two standard deviations above the mean)
in a poor county. This pattern reflects a potential mismatching of students to programs and its
relation to socioeconomic status. If these differences appear in the early application process, as
Hoxby and Avery (2013) suggests, then free tuition could have a significant effect on access to
selective programs for low-income, high-achieving students.
Furthermore, understanding the effect of free tuition on the type of programs students enroll in
can have important long-term implications. For example, Zimmerman (2014) shows that returns
to college admission in Florida led to a considerable return for those students who were admitted
at the margin. Furthermore, the returns were higher for low-income students. In Chile, Hastings
et. al. (2013) and Espinoza and Urzúa (2015) find significant heterogeneity in the returns to the
different programs of study, with larger returns to more selective programs. These programs are
usually more expensive and have a lower graduation rate, becoming a riskier decision for lowincome students, who must cover the cost of their studies through loans. In this case, Hastings
et. al. (2013) find that returns do not differ by the socioeconomic status, suggesting that policies
aimed at increasing the participation of low-income students in more selective programs may have
significant public policy implications.

2.3

Free Tuition Policy

Until 2016, Chile was characterized by highly private financing of higher education, government
support took the form of scholarships and subsidies with a merit component, imposing specific
performance requirements to access such subsidies. Perhaps the most notorious and widespread
financial aid is the state-guaranteed loan program, which, although not a subsidy per-se, did allow
many students to access loans in order to finance college (Solis, 2017). Eligible students tend
to forgo technical education to enroll in academic programs, which tend to be longer and more
expensive (Aguirre, 2019; Bucarey, Contreras, and Munoz Henriquez, 2020). This, coupled with a
decline in the graduation rate, has led several politicians and economists to raise doubts about the
long-term effects of student loans.
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With the introduction of free tuition in 2016, Chile moved towards a more significant public
financing of higher education, where financial support depends on the economic needs of families
and no longer on the student’s academic performance. In its first year of implementation, this
policy benefited students who belonged to the poorest 50% and enrolled in one of the Universities
that ascribed to the policy. Initially, only public universities, and some private universities, were
eligible for free, which left out Professional Institutes (PI) and Technical Formation Centers (CFT),
focusing mainly on technical education.
In 2017, free tuition was extended to IP and CFTs, allowing students to enroll in technical
programs. In total, 30 universities were part of this policy in the first year, which expanded to 44
in the second year when technical education was included.
The policy finances 100% of the cost of the program for a period equivalent to the duration
of the program. Five years for academic programs, and between 2 and 4 years for technical or
academic programs not leading to an bachelors degree. On average, a student studying an academic
program will receive a subsidy close to $ 30,000 over the five years of the degree.
One of the most common criticisms o this policy is the high cost it represents for the state. In
2018, the cost of free tuition was close to 1,500 $US. With this, Chile ranks as one of the countries
that spend the most on higher education, relative to the other levels of education (Espinoza and
Urzúa, 2015). This has led many experts to focus on the opportunity cost of this policy.
Beyond the total cost that a free-tuition policy may represent, the bigger problem, according
to many experts and politicians, is the distributional cost that it may imply. Free tuition could
negatively affect low-income students by encouraging their more affluent peers, who tend to obtain
better scores in the PSU, to enroll in free programs. Therefore, they would displace poorer students
who, without this increase in the demand, would have accessed such programs (Bernasconi, 2019;
Gayardon and Bernasconi, 2016; Bucarey, 2018).
Until today, few studies analyze the effects of free access to higher education for vulnerable students. Torres-Cortes (2019) uses a multilevel estimation to estimate that eligible students changed
their applications to more selective and expensive programs. Similarly, Rosa Castro-Zarzur and
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Sarzosa (2019), using a difference-in-difference approach, estimates that the introduction of free
tuition caused low-income and high-performance students to reduce their application to education
programs (which were already free for eligible students because of the Teacher’s Vocation Scholarship) towards more selective careers and with a greater expected return. Finally, Bucarey (2018)
uses a structural model to estimate the effect of universal free education on access to higher education for low-income students. Bucarey (2018) suggests that those students who would have
accessed selective programs through targeted scholarships will now be displaced towards less selective programs in a scenario of universal free tuition.
2.3.1

Who benefits from free tuition?

As argued above, one of the main concerns of free tuition is that it may harm the poorest students,
increasing inequality in access to higher education. Table 2.1 shows descriptive statistics of the
students who benefited from free education in 2016 and 2017. Most of them come from public
schools, they are considered a priority by the Ministry of Education, and they are more likely to be
first-generation students. At the same time, 23% of the students who enrolled in higher education
for free graduated in the top 10% of their high school cohort. For students who enrolled without
free tuition, this percentage was 14%.
On the other hand, students who benefit from free tuition tend to come from vulnerable counties
but not from the poorest ones. Graph 2.4 shows the correlation between the wealth of the county
and the percentage of students who accessed the free education. In 2016, when technical education
was not covered by the policy, most beneficiaries lived in medium- to low-income counties and
obtained a PSU score above the average. In 2017, when technical education was included, although
the representation of counties did not vary considerably, the proportion of students who had poorer
results in the PSU did increase.
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Table 2.1: Characteristics of Students Receiving Free Tuition
Free Tuition
(1)
Female
Priority Student
Parents with Higher Ed.
Type of School
Public
Subsidized
Private
Technical High School
Student Performance
Top 10%
Decile 2
Decile 3
Decile 4
Decile 5
Decile 6
Decile 7
Decile 8
Decile 9
Decile 10
N

Paid Tuition
(2)

0.50
0.72
0.08

0.51
0.38
0.12

0.39
0.55
0.02
0.31

0.30
0.52
0.14
0.25

0.23
0.15
0.12
0.11
0.09
0.08
0.07
0.06
0.05
0.03
77,915

0.14
0.11
0.11
0.11
0.10
0.10
0.09
0.09
0.08
0.06
555,394

Notes: Sample is composed by all student enrolled in higher education
in 2016 or 2017. I split the sample into two columns. Column (1) uses
all beneficiaries of free tuition. In Column (2), the universe is those
students who enrolled in higher education without free tuition.
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Figure 2.4: Distribution of Students Receiving Free Tuition by County Wealth and PSU Score

(a) 2016

(b) 2017

Notes: County percentiles are constructed from the per capita county income. Psu scores are groups in buns of 20
points (0.16 standard deviations). Panel a) shows students who took the PSU in 2016. Panel b) show students who
took the PSU IN 2017

When we do a ranking of schools based on the proportion of poor students they serve, we
see that most of the beneficiaries do not come from the most vulnerable schools but from those
in the middle of the distribution. Together, this shows that, although beneficiaries do come from
vulnerable backgrounds, the most disadvantaged ones use this benefit to a lesser extent.
2.3.2

Where do they go?

Another point of discussion about free tuition refers to the type of programs that beneficiaries
access. As low-income students have a disadvantaged when taking the college admission test, we
would expect that they will tend to enroll in less selective programs with lower economic returns.
On the other hand, if there are economic barriers in their decisions, then many of them will choose
to enroll in more selective programs.
Graph 2.5 shows the most common study areas among students who entered the year 2016 and
2017 to study for free. In both years, most of the students focused on social studies or engineering
and construction. The notable increase in 2017 in the engineering area is due to the incorporation
of technical careers in the construction sector.
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Figure 2.5: Most Common Areas of Study Among Students Receiving Free Tuition
2016
2017
Agriculture
Science
Social Science
Education
Humanities & Art
Ingeneering & Construction
Health/Social Services
Services

0

10,000
20,000
Number of Students

30,000

Notes: I use every student who enrolled in college in 2016 and 2017.

For 2016 and 2017, the five most common programs among beneficiaries are Business, Law,
Industrial Engineering, Nursing, and Journalism. These are usually high-return programs.
Consistent with this, beneficiaries enrolled to a greater extent in highly selective professional
programs. In 2016, about 20% of the students with free tuition entered a program within the top
10%. Among the students who enrolled without free tuition, only 9% entered these programs.
Nevertheless, there is also a considerable increase in students entering less selective programs
when the policy included technical education, in 2017.
Graph 2.6 shows that while the majority of students enrolled in academic programs, students
in public schools are more likely to enroll in technical education compared to their peers in charter
schools. Similarly, graph 2.7 shows that charter school students tend to enroll more in more selective programs, suggesting that even in the absence of economic constraints, there is still significant
heterogeneity according to the student’s socioeconomic level.
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Figure 2.6: Distribution of Students Receiving Free Tuition by County Wealth and PSU Score
Charter School
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Notes: I use every student ho enrolled in college in 2016 and 2017 for whom I had high school information.

Figure 2.7: Number of Students Enrolling in College by Program Ranking and Type of High
School
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Notes: I use every student who enrolled in college in 2016 and 2017 for whom I had high school information.

2.4

Conclusion

Despite the progress that Chile has made in access to higher education, there are still various
barriers that affect the probability of a low-income student accessing selective programs with high
economic returns. For example, in 2014, even with access to state-endorsed credit, a student living
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among the poorest counties had a considerably lower probability of attending a selective program
compared to students in more affluent counties. Furthermore, a wealthy student whose score was
one standard deviation above average was just as likely to attend a top 10 program as a poor
student whose score was almost two standard deviations above average. This gap is what Hoxby
and Bulman (2016) call the mismatch of low-income students to program quality.
This mismatch has critical economic implications due to the heterogeneity in the returns of
each type of program. As seen, the programs with the highest returns tend to be more expensive
and risky since they have a higher level of difficulty. This uncertainty in the expected returns is
one factor determining the mismatch between low-income students and selective programs. By removing part of the risk, free tuition allows low-income students to attend programs they previously
dismissed for economic reasons.
Most of the beneficiaries of the free tuition policy come from what we could call the middle
class. They are students who have relatively high high school performance compared to their
classmates. They are more likely to be considered “priority students” and have less educated
parents than the average college student in Chile. Nevertheless, the most vulnerable students use
this benefit to a lesser extent than their more affluent peers. For example, charter school graduates
are more likely to attend academic programs than those from public schools. At the same time,
the most vulnerable schools have a lower representation among beneficiaries, suggesting that the
lower tail of the distribution benefits less than those in the middle.
All this suggests that there is still a gap in academic performance among students from schools
with different degrees of vulnerability. Therefore, alternative and complementary policies are required to reduce the educational inequalities they face when deciding to enroll in higher education.
Finally, we find that the beneficiaries do not have a greater probability of dropping out of
college in the first three years of their studies, which we would expect because they are usually
students with good school performance. This evidence again suggests that tuition can reduce the
mismatch between low-income students and quality programs.
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Appendices
Appendix A. Robustness Check and Alternative Strategies
Appendix A.1. Alternative difference-in-difference approach
I first estimate an alternative model that overcomes the self-selection issue, while avoiding behavioral assumptions, by using all students who finished high school, instead of just those who
applied for financial aid. This means I cannot use eligibility status. So, I ranked schools based
on the proportion of priority (poor) students and compare enrollment changes between students in
poor schools to students in the richest schools, as described in section 3.2.2.
Table A1 presents the results of the Difference-in-Difference estimation using this school-level
variation. Students in poorer schools were more likely to enroll in college after the policy, compared to the change in the top school-decile. This was driven predominantly by an increase in
academic programs. Low-income students were 7.1-7.6 percentage points more likely to enroll in
an academic program, which represents a 57% increase, and 1.7-3.2 percentage points more likely
to enroll in a technical program, an 8-15% increase. The net effect on technical enrollment quickly
gets to statistical zero after the second decile. This is also shown graphically in Figure A1, which
plots the coefficient of interest for each school decile in the 2016 cohort. Academic programs
present similar trends, although somewhat smoother, reaching statistical zero at the eighth decile.
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0.031**
(0.0119)

Academic Program

0.0312**
(0.0123)

0.008
(0.0104)
0.0469***
(0.0113)

0.005
(0.00997)

-0.047***
(0.0132)

0.079***
(0.011)

0.012
(0.011)

-0.092***
(0.012)

Decile 3

0.0618***
(0.0119)

-0.007
(0.0102)

-0.055***
(0.0135)

0.076***
(0.012)

0.010
(0.011)

-0.086***
(0.014)

Decile 4

0.0223*
(0.0116)

-0.001
(0.0103)

-0.022*
(0.0129)

0.043***
(0.012)

0.017
(0.011)

-0.060***
(0.014)

Decile 5

0.0391***
(0.0114)

-0.017
(0.0104)

-0.023*
(0.0128)

0.045***
(0.013)

0.002
(0.011)

-0.047***
(0.014)

Decile 6

-0.015
(0.0104)

0.013
(0.0112)

0.004
(0.009)

-0.006
(0.010)

0.003
(0.011)

Decile 8

0.0325*** 0.00173
(0.00905) (0.00843)

-0.012
(0.0102)

-0.020*
(0.0115)

0.029***
(0.010)

0.006
(0.011)

-0.035***
(0.012)

Decile 7

-0.00363
(0.00854)

-0.013
(0.0105)

0.016
(0.0113)

-0.006
(0.009)

0.003
(0.010)

0.002
(0.011)

Decile 9

Note: High school deciles are constructed from a ranking of high schools based on the proportion of poor students that attend there. Poorer schools (i.e., those with
a higher proportion of poor students) are in the lower deciles. The higher the percentile, the richer the school. Panel A shows the results for cohort 2016 and panel B
shows the results for cohort 2015. I use decile 10 as the baseline comparison group and cohort 2014 as the baseline cohort.
Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered at the school level.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

2014 Mean

0.005
(0.0101)

-0.039***
(0.0136)

B. 2015 High School Cohort
No College
-0.036***
(0.0130)

Technical Program

0.076***
(0.012)

0.071***
(0.012)

Academic Program

0.032***
(0.011)

0.017*
(0.010)

-0.108***
(0.013)

A. 2016 High School Cohort
No College
-0.088***
(0.013)

Technical Program

Decile 2

Decile 1

Table A1: Difference-in-difference Using School Priority Deciles

Figure A1: Effect of Free Tuition by High School Priority-Decile
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Notes: Each point represents the coefficient of the interaction between the cohort fixed effect and the school priority
decile. The shaded area represents the 95% confidence interval. Schools in lower deciles are schools with a larger
proportion of priority students (i.e., poorer schools). The first column shows the effect of free tuition on enrollment in
technical programs, the second column on enrollment in academic programs. Each row shows the results for specific
high school cohorts. All these estimates come from a multinomial logit model where I use cohort 2014 as the baseline
cohort and school decile 10 as the baseline decile.

Because the variation comes at the school level, this procedure yields noisier estimates. It is
also important to notice that the interpretation of these coefficients is slightly different than for
the main strategy. Here, instead of comparing eligible to non-eligible students, we are comparing
students in poor schools to students in the richest schools.
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Results are consistent with the presence of heterogeneous effects, where low-income students
were more likely to react to free-tuition by enrolling, mostly, in academic programs. Also, consistent with results from the selection model, I find that lower-income students were more likely
to move from no-college to technical programs, compared to richer eligible students, who moved
mostly to academic programs.
Appendix A.2. Robustness checks
Table A2 shows the results using different specifications. In Panel A, I use a simple multinomial
logit model with no self-selection correction. By not correcting for self-selection, we overestimate
the effect of the policy in this case. Because there are two different forces biasing the results in
opposite directions, the resulting bias is moderate, but statistically different from zero. On one
hand, students who could correctly predict their eligibility status were more likely to fill the FUAS
after the policy. These new applicants are more price-sensitive and more likely to expect lower
returns from higher education. This group biases the results downwards. On the other hand,
marginally non-eligible students, who filled the FUAS for the chance of free tuition, ended up not
enrolling when eligibility status was disclosed. This group upward biases the estimation. Results
in Panel A) suggest that the latter effect was stronger.
In Panel B, I use “priority student” as a proxy for being eligible. This is, I estimate the model
with measurement error. Because many eligible students are not priority students, we may expect
downward bias from this misclassification4 . Priority students were 4.7 percentage points more
likely to attend academic programs because of free tuition. This may be interpreted as a lowerbound of the effect.
Finally, the last three panels use different numbers of nodes to approximate the distribution
of the unobserved factor. Results are not statistically different from the main specification. This
suggest that using four nodes is a good approximation of the actual distribution of the unobserved
heterogeneity.
4
This is not attenuation bias due to classical measurement error, because the misclassification here is not classical
in the sense that priority students are more likely to be eligible. This means the error is likely positive.
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Table A2: The Effect of Free Tuition on College Choice. Difference-in-Difference Robustness
Check
No college
A. Eligible - no selection correction
Eligible × C2015
-0.044***
(0.004)
Eligible × C2016
-0.078***
(0.004)
0.100
B. Priority Students
Priority × C2015
-0.0211***
(0.00307)
Priority × C2016
-0.0504***
(0.00308)
0.1131
C. Selection Corrected - 4 types
Eligible × C2015
-0.0397***
(0.00358)
Eligible × C2016
-0.0732
(0.00358)

Technical Pro- Academic
gram
Program
-0.017***
(0.004)
-0.003
(0.004)

0.061***
(0.004)
0.081***
(0.004)

-0.00336
(0.00237)
0.00350
(0.00237)

0.0244***
(0.00284)
0.0469***
(0.00284)

-0.00936***
(0.00305)
0.00469
(0.00307)

0.0490***
(0.00388)
0.0685***
(0.00390)

D. Selection Corrected - 6 types
Eligible × C2015
-0.0398***
(0.00340)
Eligible × C2016
-0.0746***
(0.00341)

-0.00951***
(0.00284)
0.00493*
(0.00286)

0.0493***
-0.00381
0.0697***
(0.00383)

E. Selection Corrected - 8 types
Eligible × C2015
-0.0407***
(0.00337)
Eligible × C2016
-0.0766***
(0.00338)

-0.00885***
(0.00286)
0.00643**
(0.00288)

0.0495***
(0.00370)
0.0701***
(0.00372)

Note: Coefficients for the interaction of the treatment variable and cohort are shown. All panels, but
panel B, uses eligibility as the treatment variable. Panel A shows the result for a naı̈ve multinomial
logit, where no correction for self-selection was in place. Panel B) uses the priority student indicator
as the treatment variable, as a proxy for eligibility. Panel C-E show the result for the selection model,
varying the number of nodes used to approximate the distribution of the unobserved factor.
Standard errors, in parenthesis, are obtained from a bootstrap procedure.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Appendix B. Likelihood Function and EM Algorithm
Given that students choose to apply for financial aid and to attend college, the contribution to the
likelihood function of student i can be written as
1(F U AS=1)

Lc (Θ|η) = P r(F U AS = 1|η)ΠJj=1 P r(c = j|η)1(c=j)
× P r(F U AS = 0|η)1(F U AS=0)
Where F U AS is an indicator function of whether the student filled the FUAS, and c describes the
college choice. The unobserved heterogeneity, η, is modelled to capture the correlation between
financial aid and college decisions. By integrating out this unobserved heterogeneity, we get the
unconditional likelihood function.
Z
Lc (Θ, η) =


1(F U AS=1)
P r(F U AS = 1|η)ΠJj=1 P r(c = j|η)1(c=j)

η

(2.1)

× P r(F U AS = 0|η)

1(F U AS=0)

dF (η)

One common way to do this is to assume a functional form for the unobserved factor, usually
a normal distribution, and numerically integrate equation 2.1. In a Discrete Factor Maximum
Likelihood procedure, instead of assuming a functional form, we approximate the distribution
with mass points ηk , with k = 1, ..., K. The unconditional likelihood function in this case is

Lc (Θ, η) =

K
X

1(F U AS=1)

pk P r(F U AS = 1|ηk )ΠJj=1 P r(c = j|ηk )1(c=j)
(2.2)

k=1

× P r(F U AS = 0|ηk )1(F U AS=0)
Where pk is the probability of the student of being in the mass point ηk . This procedure is
equivalent to a latent class model, where each mass point represents a type of student.
Using an Expectation-Maximization algorithm significantly simplifies the estimation of this
likelihood function. Because college choice is independent of financial aid application, conditional
on the unobserved factor, we can estimate both equations – college choice and FUAS application
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– separately once we control for the unobserved factor.
The general procedure of the EM algorithm is as follows:
1) Set initial values for the parameters by fitting a multinomial logit model, with no correction
for self-selection, for the college choice equation, and a logit model for the FUAS application
equation. Each student is given the same probability of being of each type, 1/K, where K
is the number of types.
2) Calculate the likelihood in 2.2 using the parameters in step 1.
3) Expectation step: Update the probability of being type k, by

Sk × Lic (Θ|ηk )
P r(k)0i = PK
k=1 Sk × Lic (Θ|ηk )
Where Sk =

1
N

PN

i=1

P r(k)i , is the share of students of type k in the previous iteration.

4) Maximization step: Estimate the probability of filling the FUAS, weighting each observation5 by the probability of being of each type. Similarly, estimate the college choice equation, conditional on filling the FUAS, using a multinomial logit weighted by the probability
of being of each type.
5) Calculate the likelihood function given these new parameters.
6) Repeat steps 3 - 5 until convergence.
For the main results, convergence is obtained when the difference between the average likelihood functions is less than 0.000001. Nevertheless, I define more stringent criteria of convergence
as robustness check and, although the number of iterations needed for convergence increased significantly, results did not significantly change. Figure ?? shows the convergence path for the
likelihood function.
5

Each student here is duplicated k times, so each observation is a student/type combination
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Appendix C. Tables and Figures
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Figure C1: Number of Students Receiving Financial Aid
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Note: Number of students receiving some kind of financial aid in each cohort the year they graduated from high
school. In 2014, almost 70,000 thousand students received financial aid. Of those, 18,000 thousand were above the
50% cutoff for free-tuition, while 52,000 students were among the poorest 50% of the population.

Figure C2: Predicted Probability of Filling FUAS, by FUAS Status
Filled FUAS

Did not Fill FUAS

Filled FUAS
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(b) With Unobserved Heterogeneity

Notes: Panel (a) show the predicted probability of filling the FUAS from a Probit model where the dependent variable
was whether the student filled the FUAS or not. Panel (b) plots the predicted probability from the full selection model,
which includes the unobserved heterogeneity. The unobserved factor dramatically increases the ability of the model
to predict financial aid application.
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Figure C3: Distribution of Students with Free Tuition by Year in College

2016

2017

Notes: For each academic year, the hight of the bar represents the total number of students receiving free tuition. In
2017, as new institutions adscribed to the policy and technical programs were included, we see a significant increase
in the number of students receiving free tuition who enroll in college for the first time. The avergae academic program
in Chile lasts 5 years, while technical programs last between 2 to 4 years.
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Table C1: Higher Education Institutions Ascribed in Free-Tuition Policy
University
Since 2016
Católica de Chile
Católica de Valparaı́so
Alberto Hurtado
de Antofagasta
Arturo Prat
Austral
Autónoma
del Bı́o Bı́o
Católica C. Silva Henrı́quez
Católica de la S. Concepción
Católica de Temuco
Católica del Maule
Católica del Norte
de Concepción
de Atacama
de Chile
de Santiago de Chile
de Talca
Diego Portales
Técnica Federico Santa Marı́a
Finis Terrae
de la Frontera
de La Serena
de Los Lagos
de Magallanes
M. de Ciencias de la Educación
de Playa Ancha
de Tarapacá
Tecnológica Metropolitana
de Valparaı́so
Since 2017
Universidad de Aysén
Universidad de O’Higgins

PI

CTF

IP Adolfo Matthei
IP Arcos
IP de Chile
IPl DUOC UC
IP INACAP
Inst. Nacional del Fútbol

CFT CEDUC UCN
CFT de Tarapacá
CFT DUOC UC
CFT ENAC
CFT INACAP
CFT San Agustı́n de Talca
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Table C2: Proportion of Eligible Students by High School Priority Deciles
Cohort
2014
School Decile
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

2015

2016

Eligible
(%)

Priority
(%)

Eligible
(%)

Priority
(%)

Eligible
(%)

90.5
86.3
83.5
79.7
76.3
71.4
62.6
51.2
35.0
13.9

83.4
72.4
65.8
59.9
54.0
47.9
40.2
29.2
16.6
2.7

87.0
82.4
77.7
75.1
72.2
67.9
61.6
52.4
39.1
22.0

75.2
64.1
57.4
51.8
47.0
41.3
35.0
25.8
14.8
2.4

88.1
82.1
79.1
76.4
73.9
68.8
62.3
52.5
37.0
11.7

Priority
(%)
76.7
65.7
59.4
53.8
49.0
43.3
36.8
27.9
16.7
2.7

Note: This table shows the variation in eligibility status based on how poor is the school. High school
deciles are constructed from a ranking of high schools based on the proportion of poor students that attend
there. Poorer schools (i.e., those with a higher proportion of poor students) are in the lower deciles. The
higher the percentile, the richer the school.
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